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Abstract 
This work proposes an alternative method for measuring monetary policy’s structural credibility under inflation 
targeting regimes by the main determinants of the expected inflation, and using a Kalman approach. It shows that 
such a method does not present some restrictions found in the existing credibility indexes, such as in Cecchetti and 
Krause (2002). It applies the new model and approach on the Brazilian case as an illustration and obtains robust 
results demonstrating that there exists a mutual dynamic relationship between expected inflation, observed inflation 
and the credibility behavior over time. 
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1. Introduction 
The expected inflation is a relevant variable when Central Banks adjust their monetary policies. As the expected 
inflation is one of the effective inflation’s determinants, which is clear by a simple new Keynesian Phillips curve 
(Clarida et al. 1999; Svensson 2000), the higher the expected inflation the higher the social costs from reacting to 
inflation shocks. Additionally, the expected inflation is an important variable in determining expected short-term 
interest rates, and thus the long-term interest rate, thereby causing expressive effects on the output dynamics 
(Woodford 2003). Moreover, the expected inflation dynamics can inform on the monetary policy’s credibility, as the 
latter depends on the weight of inflation targets (and of the lagged inflation) on the expected inflation (Lalonde 
2005; Moreira 2013a).  
 
Therefore, given that inflationary expectations are important in many aspects, it is not strange that there exists a 
recent literature which aims at explaining the expected inflation phenomenon at a theoretical level, and, at the same 
time, at researching empirical correlation and/or causality between that variable and lagged inflation, output 
dynamics, exchange rates, among others. Indeed, the empirical specification of the expected inflation dynamics 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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depends strongly on the theoretical specification of the effective inflation or Phillips curve, if the rational 
expectations hypothesis is assumed into the reference model. 
 
Several developing economies have adopted the inflation targeting regime over the last decades as a way for 
controlling inflation rates and anchoring inflationary expectations. Brazil, particularly, has adopted inflation targets 
since 1999. However, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB) has not achieved the inflation target (4.5% for the Broad 
Consumer Prices Index) in the last years, so that the monetary authorities’ reputation presumably can be lost, 
thereby increasing costs of future disinflation cases. Deviations of the effective inflation around the inflation target 
affect the monetary policy’s credibility, that is, they make the expected inflation more sensible to the observed or 
lagged inflation dynamics, and therefore less anchored on the inflation target (Moreira 2013b). Thus, measuring the 
long-term (and short-term) relationships between expected inflation and other relevant variables is useful in 
signaling on the monetary policy’s structural credibility, besides informing on how to control inflationary 
expectations.  
 
This work aims at presenting an alternative method for measuring monetary policy’s credibility by means of a time-
varying or Kalman filter approach and applying it on the Brazilian case as an illustration. As it will be argued, the 
existing indexes that measure monetary policy’s credibility, such as in Cecchetti and Krause (2002), among others, 
have some methodological problems. My analysis builds on the study by Moreira (2013a,b), but extends his work in 
several directions, including theoretical contributions and the consideration of different robustness tests.  
 
Regarding those methodological problems, e.g. imposition of ad hoc boundaries by the existing indexes, the current 
approach, however, does not impose restrictions on agents’ behavior or evaluation, “allowing the data to speak more 
directly about alternative expectations hypothesis” (Fuhrer 1992, p.176). Fuhrer (op.cit.) proposed a seminal method 
applied on expectations behavior based on a model in which the main instrument of the US’s monetary policy was 
the money growth, and the credibility of such policy could be inferred by the weight of the Fed’s announcements of 
money growth on expectations. In turn, my approach is mainly applied on inflation targeting regimes (although it is 
feasible for countries that target implicitly consumer inflation such as the US), in which the main instrument of 
monetary policy is the basic interest rate and the credibility can be inferred by the weight of announced (or implicit) 
inflation targets on inflationary expectations.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents theoretical aspects and some related empirical results; Section 
3 presents the data, the empirical strategy and the analysis of results, as well as the ways by which I tested for their 
robustness. Finally, concluding remarks, references and a statistical appendix are presented.    
 
2.  Related Literature 
 
2.1. Theoretical aspects 
 
Controlling expected inflation rates is an important aspect in the monetary policy literature. Basically, if the Central 
Bank aims at controlling inflation dynamics with lower social costs, consistently managing inflationary expectations 
is a necessary requirement. Such a management requires a credible commitment and when the Central Bank 
effectively commits itself to the announced target, the latter has higher weight on the expected inflation dynamics. 
There is a specific literature that studies the properties of the monetary policy’s credibility and the impacts of its 
changes on macroeconomic performance and policy’s efficiency (see Argov et al. 2007; Lalonde 2005; Moreira 
2013a). 
 
Under inflation targeting regimes, particularly when the Central Bank has low credibility degree, the expected 
inflation becomes more sensible to past inflation, and less sensible to the Central Bank’s announced goals. Then, in 
such a situation, disinflation cases have to be attained through strongly increasing interest rates and thereby largely 
decreasing output levels. According to Moreira (2013a, p. 5), “Central banks with lower (higher) credibility degrees 
are constrained (improved) by inflationary dynamics which is more (less) sensible to the past inflation levels, that is, 
in such a case there is more (less) inertia in the inflationary process”.   Thus measuring credibility is a fundamental 
step. The credibility index proposed by Cecchetti and Krause (2002) is: 
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(1) If E(S) ≤ S * then C = 1;  
(2) If S * < E(S) < 20% then C = 1 – [1/(0.2 – S@>(SS@
And if E(S) > 20% then C = 0. 
 
Where E(S) stands for inflationary expectations and S for the inflation target. Hence, the credibility varies from 0 
to 1 depending on deviations of expected inflation around the target, with ad hoc maximum limit at 20% per year as 
the condition for zero credibility. In turn, De Mendonça (2004) presents an alternative credibility index that can be 
applied for economies with inflation intervals above and below the main target: 
 
(4) If E(S) = S* then C = 1; 
(5) If S*Min < E(S) < S*Max then C = 1 – [1/(S*Max – S*)][E(S) – S*]; 
(6) And if E(S) ≥ S*Max or E(S) ≤ S*Min then C = 0.  
 
In such a case, when inflationary expectations are above the maximum inflation target level or are below the 
minimum inflation target level the credibility index is equal to zero. Within this method, although such limits are 
defined by the Central Bank, any shock pushing inflationary expectations beyond those limits are translated in zero 
credibility, even if firms and households have evaluated the monetary policy as credible over time. In such models, 
measuring monetary policy’s credibility requires to impose certain ad hoc conditions that make the index varying 
between 0 and 1.      
 
Alternatively, Moreira (2013a) presents a model in which the credibility degree is a dependent and at the same time 
an explainable variable into the macroeconomic dynamics. In this perspective, the lower the inflation and output 
deviations from their targets, the higher the credibility degree obtained by the Central Bank. Two specific situations 
would be possible: a) the credibility degree would be equal to unity if lagged inflation deviations were null, such a 
case been considered as a special one, and; b) the credibility degree would be less than unity if lagged inflation 
deviations were higher than zero, regarded as the general case. With these two conditions the credibility degree 
would vary from 0 to 1 over time. Moreover, into this model, the credibility degree depends on its own past values, 
through an auto-regressive component. 
 
To close the model, Moreira (2013a) proposes an expected inflation deviation function, which basically depends on 
lagged inflation deviations and on the credibility degree. Let us introduce a new component into this equation, i.e. a 
sample of control variables, such as output and exchange rate, and thereby creating the following form:  
 








 F + Ht 
Where Et[St+1] is the expected inflation deviation for t+1 period, Ct-1 is the credibility degree in t-1 period, Fi is the 
control variable i associated with the parameter ai and H is a stochastic term (a supply shock).  By (7), if credibility 
in t-1 period is maximum (Ct-1 = 1), the expected inflation deviation for t+1 period depends only on the inflation 
target and on a sample of control variables (F)*, such as output and exchange rate deviations from their equilibrium 
values, even if a positive or negative lagged inflation deviation occurred in t-1 period. In such a case, inflationary 
expectations do not depend on observed or lagged inflation, that is, there is no adaptive process in such expectations 
and, as a consequence, the inflation dynamics presents less inertia. 
Otherwise, if Ct-1 < 1 the expected inflation deviation is partially or integrally (i.e. for Ct-1 = 0) dependent on the 
inflation deviation in t-1, along with the other variables. The parameter P, in turn, could be regarded as been 
determined by the inflation target, the credibility degree and by other idiosyncratic variables with respect to inflation 
trend.   
 
 
*  Moreira (2012) does not include such control variables and shock component into its equation.  
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At an empirical level, the equation (7) means that if there exists Central Bank’s low credibility, it will be possible to 
test for and indentify a strong long-term correlation between expected inflation and observed inflation. Otherwise, if 
there exists a Central Bank’s high credibility, it will be observed a weak or null (at the limit) long-term correlation 
between these two stochastic variables. To measure the monetary policy’s structural credibility (C), we should apply 
a time series method to estimate E = (1 – C) in equation (7), under the null hypothesis (H0: E = 0) for perfect 
credibility.  
In comparison with seminal works on credibility indexes for monetary policies, such as Cecchetti and Krause (2002) 
among others, the basic difference regarding Moreira (2013a,b) method is that while those works measure 
credibility by imposing ad hoc limits or restrictions on the estimated scale in order to normalize it from 0 to 1, in 
Moreira (op. cit.) such a scale is extracted by the estimated monetary policy’s structural credibility, thereby without 
applying any arbitrary bound. An example of a previous work in this same spirit is Fuhrer (1992), although it had 
been applied on a different monetary problem, that is, the way by which credibility is determined when the Central 
Bank adjusts the money supply as its main instrument and there does not exist an explicit inflation target announced 
by monetary authorities.  
As it is possible to note, the structural credibility (C) can be measured by directly extracting an estimated coefficient 
(E) over time for the correlation between expected inflation and the lagged one. This extraction can be made by time 
varying approaches such as the Kalman filter (Harvey 1989). In contrast, the other existing methods recently applied 
on the analysis of credibility under inflation targeting regimes need to impose ad hoc limits as their values are 
calculated without  necessarily establishing a structural measure or theory for the monetary policy’s credibility.     
 
2.2. Empirical evidences regarding expected inflation, current inflation and credibility 
 
Levin et al. (2004) studied the case for a possible “delinked” between expected inflation and lagged inflation in 
inflation targeters (IT) and non-IT countries, through implementing a pooled regression in which the left-hand-side 
variable is the first difference of inflation expectations and the right hand-side variable is the first difference of 
lagged effective consumer inflation. The authors found that in the non-IT countries (such as the US and some euro 
area countries) there was highly significant correlation of the expected inflation with a three-year moving average of 
lagged inflation; but in the IT countries there was a kind of an anchored expected inflation, that is, for these last 
countries the inflationary expectations have presented less dependence on the lagged or observed inflation.     
 
In turn, Kelly (2008) analyzed relationships between the general public (and also the professionals’) inflationary 
expectations and the current inflation in the United Kingdom economy, by applying a Granger causality approach. 
The work found evidences on non-Granger causality relationship from current inflation to the expected one, under 
both group of expectations, in the post-IT period. However, prior to the IT adoption, the UK economy presented a 
Granger causality relationship from current inflation to inflationary expectations, whether the proxy for expectations 
is the professionals case or the general public case. These results are interpreted by the author as follows: “The most 
obvious interpretation of expectations becoming less sensitive to current inflation, is that they became anchored to 
the target (which also suggests that the target was credible), rather than being based on the current rate of RPI 
inflation itself.”(Kelly 2008, p. 11).    
 
For the Brazilian case, Minella et al. (2002) had estimated the determinants of Brazil’s market inflation rate 
expectations using OLS estimates from January 2000 to June 2002. They found statistical significance for the 
positive effect of inflation targets on the expected inflation, while there was not such a significance for effects of the 
lagged inflation. Therefore, the authors concluded that inflation targets would be adequately anchoring inflationary 
expectations in Brazil.  
 
In contrast, Carvalho and Bugarin (2006) adopted the expected inflation 12 months ahead, studied its determinants 
over the period from June 1999 to November 2003 and attained results that show a non-linear behavior of the 
sensibility of expected inflation to lagged inflation changes. This sensibility becomes higher after November 2002 – 
as well as the role of the inflation target as an attractor for the inflationary expectations becomes lower –, when the 
exchange rate expressively increased and there existed many uncertainties on the future Brazilian economic policy. 
Lowenkron and Garcia (2007) also identified results for causality from inflation rate deviations to the expected 
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inflation deviation. These evidences could be interpreted as a result of low credibility in the Brazilian monetary 
policy.  
 
Besides, Bevilaqua et al. (2007) found evidences for the role of the inflation target as an attractor of inflationary 
expectations, under the period from 2000 to 2008. After verifying important determinants on these expectations, 
such as the exchange rate, they also identified that the sensibility of the expected inflation to the lagged inflation was 
higher under the period of political uncertainties in 2002 and 2003. In a broad sense, such results could be regarded 
as showing a gradual gain of credibility by the Brazilian Central Bank, because the sensibility of the expected 
inflation to the observed inflation has decreased in the years after the confidence crisis of 2002 and 2003.  
 
Finally, by implementing the Copulas method, Moreira et al. (2013) analyzed the dependence relationship or 
structure between the Brazilian consumer observed inflation and the expected inflation, from January 2005 to June 
2011. The estimations were consistent with some works for the Brazilian case, such as Palma and Portugal (2010), 
as the dependence structure measures showed that there exists a weak relationship between those variables, thereby 
confirming the hypothesis of high credibility for the Brazilian monetary policy under the inflation targeting period.  
 
3. Data, empirical strategy and results 
 
3.1. Cointegration and long-term relationships 
 
The time series were collected for the period from January 2005 to July 2012. The following variables were used in 
this work: EXP_P: the expected inflation (measured by the Broad Consumer Prices Index – Source: Brazilian 
Central Bank) for 12 months ahead; P: the observed inflation (measured by the Broad Consumer Prices Index – 
Source: Brazilian Central Bank); E: the nominal exchange rate (quantity of domestic currency to buy one unity of 
US dollar – Source: Brazilian Central Bank); Y: the general industry’s activity index (Source: Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics).  
 
Unit root tests, such as ADF, PP and DF-GLS (Appendix) have demonstrated that the four variables are I(1), so that 
applying cointegration approaches is a feasible option (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 1991). In sequence, a 
cointegration test has been performed following the Johansen procedure (Johansen and Juselius 1990; Johansen op. 
cit.). In such a case, the specification with intercept and without trend in data was regarded as the best one, based on 
the Akaike and Schwarz criteria (Appendix)†.  
 
In fact, there is a long-term relationship between the variables, as a cointegrating equation was identified by the 
Johansen test. The Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests were used to determine the number of possible 
cointegrating equations. Although the Trace test has suggested three equations at 10% level, the Maximum 
Eigenvalue indicated only one equation (Appendix). In such a case, the more parsimonious model was chosen as the 
best option. The model was estimated with the variables in their log form, in order to allow for elasticity 
relationships. We can observe the estimated cointegrating equation in Table 1.     
 
The estimated coefficients are consistent with the principles of the New Keynesian economy (Clarida et al. 1999) 
and they present statistical significance at 1%. As the expected inflation can be expressed as the iteration of a 
Phillips Curve one period forward, we can expect to find a positive relationship between EXP_P and P (e.g. by a 
backward-looking Phillips curve), Y and E. In this sense, over the period from January 2005 to July 2012, an 
increase of 1% in observed inflation was contemporaneously followed by an addition of 0.5% in expected inflation; 
the general industry’s activity in Brazil also has an important long-term correlation with expected inflation: an 
increase of 1% in the former is accompanied by an increase of 6% in the latter. In turn, the undervaluation of the 
domestic currency with reference to the U.S. dollar can expressively affect expected inflation: for each 1% of 
 
 
† The first step for testing long-term relationships was to identify the optimal lag order of the unrestricted Vector Autoregressive model, by means 
of information criteria, such as AIC, SIC and HQ criteria, which showed that the best option was to adopt 01 lag in the estimated VAR. 
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undervaluation there is 2.24% of addition in expected consumer inflation.   
 










  [5.499] 
Constant  -29.679 
 (4.905) 
  [ -6.050] 
Note: “( )” for standard error and “[ ]” for t-statistic. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Alternatively, short-term relationships between the same variables can be analyzed through the VEC model, which 
includes the cointegration disturbances inducing a correction mechanism. Because the long-term equilibrium can be 
disturbed by shocks, it is necessary that short-term reactions occur to restore the long-term cointegration. Table 2 
presents the correction mechanism and we can observe that the general industry’s activity in Brazil is the variable 
for such correction. Indeed, an addition of 1% in expected inflation that is not followed by changes in the other 
variables (i.e. by a shock) results in an increase of 0.078% in Y into one month ahead. In other words, it means that 
the system achieves the whole correction over about 12.6 months.  
 
Table 2 – Error Correction mechanism 
  D(LOG(EXP_P)) D(LOG(P)) D(LOG(Y)) D(LOG(E)) 
"ut-1" -0.050956  0.004850  0.078929  0.004423 
 (0.03776)  (0.04216)  (0.01467)  (0.04229) 
  [-1.34949] [ 0.11502] [ 5.37896] [ 0.10459] 
Notes: “ut-1” for the cointegration disturbance in the month t-1. “( )” for standard error and “[ ]” for t-statistics. Source: Own 
elaboration. 
 
The short-term responses of EXP_P to impulses in P, Y and E can be viewed from impulse-response functions, 
which are presented in Figure 1. Moreover, a Granger causality test showed that P, E and Y Granger-cause 
inflationary expectations in short-term jointly (Appendix), although only P causes EXP_P individually. By the 
Figure 1, it is possible to observe that only D(P) shocks have impacts on D(EXP_P) with statistical significance, as 







‡ In other formal terms, LOG(EXP_P) = -29.6 + 0.50 LOG(P) + 6.02 LOG(Y) + 2.24 LOG (E).   
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Figure 1. Responses of inflationary expectations to impulses in the other variables 
 
Note: “D” for the first difference, as the VEC model applies the series in their differences over time. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
3.2. Revised structural credibility and the Kalman Filter with priors 
 
Accepting the autoregressive specification to calculate the structural credibility, we need to reconsider the structural 
credibility value through a revised structural equation, such that: 
 








 F ] + Yt 
In such a way, the coefficient that relates lagged inflation to the dependent variable becomes E = (1 – C)(1 – U). 
Hence, we can calculate the structural credibility by the simple expression C = 1 – [E(1 – U]. For instance, by using 
the estimated coefficients, we have C = 0.538, which is higher than the value obtained by the non-inertial regression 
of the section 3.2, but lower than that found in Moreira (2013b) (0.626).  
 
We can also extract the C path during the studied sample by applying the Kalman filter on (8)§, in the same line of 
Moreira (2013b), but by additionally imposing priors on the mean and variance values of E, which are collected 
from the statistical properties of its estimates. These priors are, respectively, (0.096; 0.0006) for Regression 6. 
Imposing such priors is important to help the Kalman algorithm in its learning process, thereby reducing 
unnecessary volatility of the estimates. As we extract the E time trajectory it is possible to calculate the C path by 
adopting C = 1 – [E(1 – U] for each month. 
 
We can view the time trajectory of C in Graph 1. The Kalman filter, as a recursive process (Harvey 1989), generates 
more uncertainty for the initial values of the series, so that they present higher variance in comparison with the last 
values. It occurs basically because the initial values are estimated with less information than the last ones. Thus, to 
make the trend of C clearer, I applied the HP (Hodrick-Prescott) filter on such a series and present its original values 












§ To estimate (8) and apply the Kalman filter on it, I specified the regression with the following independent variables: Constant, LOG(EXP_P(-
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Graph 1 – Trajectory of Brazil’s monetary policy credibility extracted by the Kalman Filter with priors and 
its HP trend 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
Some preliminary considerations can be made. First, the Brazilian monetary policy’s credibility increases (in trend 
values) from 2005 and it gradually stabilizes itself at 0.571 through the years of 2009-2012. The initial increasing 
credibility probably occurred due to the consolidation of the inflation targeting regime in Brazil over that period 
(2005-2008) and to the overvaluation of the domestic currency after the higher prices of commodities exported by 
Brazil. The country presented inflation rates that were relatively stable and below the inflation target, as well as 
GDP growth rates that created optimism for private investments.  
 
In contrast, since 2009, we can observe a stagnation of the monetary policy’s credibility in trend values. Brazil had 
to face problems related to the international financial crisis (Subprime crisis). This post-Subprime crisis period was 
followed, in turn, by an undervalued domestic currency and lower commodities prices, thereby changing the 
expectations for the Brazilian economy. Additionally, after 2009, Brazil’s monetary policy was conducted in a 
different way, specifically from 2011, by Dilma Rousseff’s government. An explicit bias for declining basic interest 
rates, in such a recent period, has contributed negatively to increase consumer inflation deviations and to stagnate 
the monetary policy’s credibility at a suboptimal degree. Indeed, a credibility around 0.5 means that there is still 
high correlation of inflationary expectations with lagged inflation and thereby a high inflationary inertia.  
 
Concluding remarks: macroeconomic performance and monetary policy’s credibility 
 
In what extent does the credibility index explain consumer inflation deviations or other important macroeconomic 
deviations in Brazil? Alternatively, in what extent is it explained by these deviations? We can assess these questions 
by making another VAR exercise. Basically, it can be composed by all the variables of the previous regressions 
(EXP_P, P, E, Y), including C (Credibility) that was extracted in the last section and presented on Graph 1. 
However, while those four variables are I(1), as mentioned earlier, C is I(0) based on ADF, PP and DF-GLS unit 
root tests. Hence, we can perform a VAR with I(1) variables in their first difference, while including C in level**, 
instead of a VEC model.  
 
In turn, to analyze the dynamic relationships among the selected series, the generalized impulse-response functions 
will be chosen as the appropriate method †† . Moreover, we will pay attention only to the relationships that 
 
 
** A test for defining the optimal lag order of this VAR has shown that it has 01 lag (Appendix), but we made robustness tests by expanding its 
number of lags. Such a benchmark VAR presents stability as the inverse roots test is consistent with all the roots inside the unit circle. Although 
such a VAR, on the one hand, presents problems of residual correlation (based on the LM test), on the other hand, it is corrected by the VAR with 
06 lags, as we argue into the robustness checking section ahead.  
†† Unlike the conventional method that assumes the Cholesky ordering and it is sensible to re-ordering of the series (Lutkenpohl 1991), the 
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demonstrate statistical significance by their confidence interval. Such an analysis will be presented forward in a new 
version of the current work.   
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